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INACCURACY AND THE INVOLUNTARY 
CONFESSION: UNDERSTANDING ROGERS 
V. RICHMOND RIGHTLY 
DEAN A. STRANG* 
Inaccurate, unreliable, or altogether false confessions in custody are not 
new.  Long before the false confessions of the Central Park Five or Brendan 
Dassey, others had been confessing falsely, without making the news.1  
Often, false confessions include notably inaccurate details.  Consider three 
long past cases. 
Stephen Boorn and his siblings were the local misfits in Manchester, 
Vermont.2  And his sister’s husband had wanderlust, as the neighbors knew.3  
But by the time that Stephen’s brother-in-law had been missing for seven 
years, small-town suspicions prevailed.  Stephen’s brother was arrested and 
he eventually accused Stephen of murdering the missing brother-in-law.4  He 
 
 * Visiting Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law; A.B., Dartmouth 
College; J.D., University of Virginia. 
 1 The “Central Park Five” is the common description of five teenaged boys who confessed 
falsely, in coercive interviews by New York police officers, to raping a jogger in Central Park 
in 1989. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, 5 Exonerated in Central Park Jogger Case Agree to Settle 
Suit for $40 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014, at A1. Brendan Dassey was a 16-year-old 
boy with learning disabilities when (after earlier questioning sessions) he finally gave a halting 
statement inculpating himself in a murder, adopting some accurate details that law 
enforcement officers provided but getting other details wildly wrong when left to his own 
claims. His case drew worldwide attention in Netflix’s Making A Murderer. Making A 
Murderer: Plight of the Accused (Netflix 2015), https://www.netflix.com/title/80000770 
[https://perma.cc/J379-WCXB] [hereinafter Making a Murderer]; see also Dassey v. 
Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding, 4–3, that the state court findings 
of voluntariness were not so unreasonable that they could be set aside on federal habeas). 
 2 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
15–21 (1932). Borchard was a Yale professor of international law, not especially interested in 
criminal law for its own sake, but convinced that governments have a moral responsibility to 
compensate wrongly convicted people. In path breaking work, he and a research assistant 
collected and documented 65 cases of innocent people convicted and imprisoned. See also 
Bernard C. Gavit, Book Review, 8 IND. L.J. 147 (1932) (reviewing EDWIN M. BORCHARD, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932)). 
 3 BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 15. 
 4 Id. at 17. 
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relayed to authorities the story of the murder that he claimed Stephen told 
him, implicating himself, too.5 
Months after Stephen’s ensuing arrest, during which authorities pressed 
him intermittently to admit murder, Stephen did confess.6  He told a story 
rich in detail but very different than the one his brother attributed to him—
and a story that did not implicate the brother, although again, his brother had 
implicated himself.7 
With the two confessions, supplemented by a jailhouse informant’s 
claim that Stephen’s brother had confessed colorfully to him with yet a third 
version of the murder, a jury convicted both brothers.8  They would hang.9 
That is, they would until the murdered brother-in-law returned 
reluctantly, but in fine health, from New York.10  He had left because he was 
tired of marriage to Stephen’s sister.11  But no, the two Boorn brothers never 
had hurt him. 
Well to the south and almost exactly one hundred years later, Louise 
Butler and George Yelder, a married man, were carrying on an affair in rural 
Lowndes County, Alabama.12  Louise’s two nieces, 14 and 9, lived with her, 
as did her 12-year old daughter.13  One day, Louise was in a jealous rage, 
believing that George and the 14-year old niece had coupled in her absence.14  
Louise beat the niece, who then disappeared.15 
Eventually, through the efforts of a deputy sheriff, the two remaining 
girls told a gruesome story of how Louise and George murdered the 14-year 
old niece with an ax, dismembered her body, gathered it in a sack, and 
dumped the sack in the river nearby.16  There was no physical evidence 
supporting the story.17  In the custody of the sheriff himself, after several days 
Louise supposedly gave a loosely similar confession, differing in some 
details.18  She also showed the sheriff the spot on the river bank where she 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 17–18. 
 8 Id. at 18. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 20. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 40–45. 
 13 Id. at 40. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 40–41. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 42. 
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and George had pitched the body into the water.19  Louise then recanted 
almost immediately.20 
After a jury convicted George and Louise of murder, the dead niece 
turned up in a neighboring county, living with other relatives to whom she 
had fled after Louise beat her.21  Apparently, she did not like Aunt Louise. 
Turning north again and back seventeen years, John “Dogskin” Johnson 
was lurching through life in Madison, Wisconsin.22  He seems to have had 
limited intellect, people thought him strange, and being drunk much of the 
time did not help.23  When a neighboring 7-year-old girl disappeared from 
bed overnight and turned up murdered in a nearby lake, suspicion fell on 
Dogskin.24  Investigators faced at least three problems, though.  First, a tiny 
broken pane in the garret room in which the little girl slept with her two 
brothers and the family dog would not have allowed the girl out, let alone a 
grown man in.25  Second, the brothers and the dog, crammed into the small 
room, had not awakened.26  Third, Dogskin’s wife said he had not left their 
house that night.27 
Arrested anyway, Dogskin Johnson maintained innocence in an “all-
night grilling” and won his release.28  But then the police learned of his prior 
record for taking liberties with girls and two commitments to “insane 
asylums.”29  They arrested him again.30 
After his re-arrest, Dogskin again withstood hard interrogation by police 
officers for hours.31  He insisted that he was innocent.32  The police learned 
from him, though, that he once had watched the brutal torture and lynching 
of a black man.33  That experience left him terrified of mobs.34  And it gave 
his interrogators the edge. 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 42. 
 21 Id. at 43. 
 22 Id. at 112–21. 
 23 Id. at 113–16. 
 24 Id. at 112–14. 
 25 Id. at 114, 116. 
 26 Id. at 119. 
 27 Id. at 114. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 116. 
 34 Id. at 116–17. 
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In a ruse, the police eventually told Dogskin that a mob was gathering 
for him outside the jail.35  Panicked, he confessed in detail.36  He also insisted 
on pleading guilty that very day and won a promise that if he did, the police 
would spirit him to the state penitentiary far from town immediately.37  He 
pled guilty and the police kept their word (and their ruse), slipping him out 
of town in the backseat of a car and insisting that he hide under a blanket for 
the first ten miles.38  Dogskin was in prison the night of his plea.39  His 
conviction rested on the confession alone, corroborated only by the fact that 
the girl was dead.40 
Like many prisoners before and since, Dogskin soon began to write 
from his prison cell, urging his innocence.41  He had confessed only to avoid 
a violent death at the hands of a mob, he insisted.42  It took nine years, but 
eventually a former judge became convinced that Dogskin was telling the 
truth: he was innocent.43  The former judge persuaded the governor to order 
a pardon hearing.44  Publicity about that hearing prompted a surprise witness 
to come forward, a good friend of the dead girl’s mother.45  That woman 
relayed how she had seen the girl’s mother burning bloody bedding and a 
little nightgown in the kitchen the morning after her disappearance.46  The 
woman also had learned that the night before, the girl’s father—drunken 
during a card game in that same kitchen—had bashed the girl behind the ear 
with a beer bottle, causing her to pitch headfirst and unconscious into the 
stove.47  The father carried the little girl upstairs to her cot and the family 
found her dead in bed later.48  They hired a man to dispose of her body after 
hiding it at home.49 
 
 35 Id. at 115–16. 
 36 Id. at 120–21. 
 37 Id. at 115. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 114–15. 
 41 Id. at 115–16. 
 42 Id. at 113–14. 
 43 Id. at 114. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 115–16. 
 46 Id. at 116. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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The statute of limitations on second-degree murder had passed, so the 
girl’s father escaped justice.50  But Dogskin was freed after more than ten 
years in prison.51 
I 
Butler’s judge probably excluded at least one of her statements after her 
recantation and Boorn’s jury seems to have rejected his written confession 
(convicting him all the same).  But Johnson pled guilty and it appears that at 
least some of their wildly incorrect statements got to the Boorn and Butler 
juries.52  Because the three cases arose between 1819 and 1928 in state courts, 
American judges would not have recognized a basis in the federal 
constitution to exclude the statements, state law aside.53  Still, the 
confessions’ unreliability, their outright lack of veracity, begged even then 
the question: did Stephen Boorn, Louise Butler and the two girls, and 
Dogskin Johnson speak voluntarily? 
This Article explores the relationship between inaccuracy and 
involuntariness and why courts mistakenly believe that they must ignore that 
relationship.  Part II begins with an overview of the relationships between 
accuracy or inaccuracy of details in confessions, and voluntariness or 
involuntariness of those incriminating statements.  It identifies broadly, too, 
the systemic values at stake in those relationships. 
Part III follows with a brief history of the legal rationales supporting 
exclusion of involuntary statements, tracing them lightly as they have 
changed over time.  It is background here and does not pretend to be a 
comprehensive account. 
Part IV introduces the principal case that established a mechanical 
symmetry from the exclusive truth-seeker’s perspective, the United States 
Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in Rogers v. Richmond.54  That part looks 
first at Rogers itself, and then at how courts have applied its test to bar 
 
 50 Id. at 118. 
 51 Id. at 110–18. As to the interrogation, Borchard described an “all-night grilling,” “hours 
of rapid-fire and relay examination,” and “hammering at” Johnson with the aid of an outside 
Burns Detective Agency employee. Id. at 112. 
 52 ROB WARDEN, WILKIE COLLINS’ THE DEAD ALIVE: THE NOVEL, THE CASE, AND 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 121–22, 153 (2005). 
 53 The federal government would not begin to exclude coerced confessions used in state 
courts until 1936, when in Brown v. Mississippi the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s 
involuntary confession extracted by use of police violence violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Later cases would develop further the 
federal courts’ role in review of coerced confessions used in state courts. See infra Part III. 
 54 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
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consideration of both accuracy and inaccuracy of a confession in deciding 
voluntariness. 
Part V explains why courts have been both casual and wrong in that 
application.  It argues that only accuracy of details should be excluded as 
irrelevant to voluntariness.  Accuracy in the recollection of details is as likely 
from a guilty but coerced speaker, a guilty and uncoerced speaker, or an 
innocent and coerced speaker who was fed information by the police; so, if 
coercion and involuntariness are unacceptable because dignity and integrity 
are ends in addition to truth, then accuracy simply becomes irrelevant.  In 
other words, accuracy in detail is incapable of helping to discriminate among 
those three possible explanations. 
By sharp contrast, inaccuracy of a confession may be, and often is, 
relevant to involuntariness: the voluntary speaker who wishes to confess has 
no reason to give inaccurate details unless drugs, alcohol, or mental illness 
cloud his recollection or he hopes to mitigate his responsibility.  The first 
cause he can explain; the second cause the police often are in a good position 
to assess. But the involuntary speaker who is attempting just to make the 
interrogation stop very well may spew inaccurate details, either because he 
is factually innocent and does not know what happened or because he is 
culpable but calculates his responses to please the interrogator, again so that 
he gets the earliest and fullest relief from the interrogation.  Because lack of 
recall, false partial self-exculpation to reduce responsibility, or both, also are 
lively possibilities (and common realities) in explaining inaccuracies, those 
inaccuracies do not establish involuntariness by themselves.  Instead, they 
simply are probative of involuntariness.  In a given case, the government may 
carry its burden of proving voluntariness despite inaccuracies.  In another 
case, though, it may not.  The point is that inaccuracies rightly bear on the 
question of involuntariness. 
Part VI concludes that Rogers v. Richmond is no bar to a proper 
asymmetry in the consideration of accuracy and inaccuracy—courts can and 
should consider inaccuracy in confessions when deciding whether they were 
voluntary or involuntary, but should not consider accuracy as evidence that 
the statements were voluntary.  Understanding the case correctly, this has 
been true since the day the Court decided Rogers.  Part VI also concludes 
that, from the perspective of the real world in which American courts must 
and do have ends other than pure truth-seeking, including but not limited to 
human dignity and institutional integrity, a rightful asymmetry in mechanics 
produces no asymmetry in outcomes or values at all. 
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II 
Inaccurate details well may be relevant to involuntariness, although the 
former does not always establish the latter.  If a statement is inaccurate, if the 
confessor has gotten basic details wrong, he possibly (but not certainly) 
spoke out of fear, pain, or hope of gain to end the questioning, not out of 
actual knowledge willingly disclosed.  Or, he might have spoken voluntarily, 
but just lied.  Either way, inaccuracies in a confession at least bear on the 
question of involuntariness.55 
Likewise, there is a relationship between accuracy and voluntariness, 
although, again, one does not establish the other.  For example, a guilty 
woman may have told the truth, accurately, but not necessarily because she 
chose freely to do so.  She might have spoken involuntarily, but given truthful 
details—either because she actually was guilty but coerced to speak, or 
because she was innocent and got accurate details from the police that she 
adopted as her own.56  And of course, she might have spoken both accurately 
and voluntarily, to unburden her conscience, salve her religious views, or 
serve some other purpose. 
If truth-seeking were the only goal of criminal justice, then, we still 
would have to consider voluntariness of confessions instrumentally.  Why?  
Both voluntariness and involuntariness might bear on accuracy (or truth, in 
other words).  Deciding the voluntariness question would be an essential 
means—one of many—to the end of truth-seeking.  And consideration would 
be symmetrical, in a sense.  If truth-seeking were the exclusive goal, we 
would want to explore whether accuracy suggested voluntariness in a given 
case, and also would want to assess whether inaccuracy suggested 
involuntariness.  We would do both because it really would be accuracy and 
inaccuracy that we cared about alone in the end, not voluntariness for its own 
sake.  Our conclusions on accuracy or inaccuracy then would determine our 
further efforts to find truth. 
But because the criminal justice system has ends and values in addition 
to truth57—whether those other ends are subordinate, coordinate, or even 
 
 55 The Supreme Court has noted that “there may be a relationship between the 
involuntariness of a confession and its unreliability,” although it never has said that this 
relationship is the point of the doctrine of excluding coerced statements. Lego v. Twomey, 
404 U.S. 477, 484 & n.12 (1972) (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385–86 (1964)). 
 56 In the argot of police interview experts and psychologists, this is “contamination.” To 
cite one widely known example, contamination featured prominently in the interrogation of 
Brendan Dassey, the 16-year old boy in Netflix’s Making A Murderer, supra note 1. 
 57 See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (“There is no gainsaying 
that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system,” but implicitly 
acknowledging that it is not the only goal); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–10 
(1974) (recognizing privileges that serve interests important enough to block truth-finding, 
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superordinate—the instruments change subtly. Indeed, voluntariness might 
become a corollary end in itself, not just a means or an instrument.  If 
preserving individual human dignity and the integrity of human institutions 
also are ends of criminal justice, then voluntariness is essential.58  An 
involuntary confession undermines both individual and institutional integrity 
and dignity, even if accurate.  That is, the tormentor diminishes both the one 
tormented and himself; the manipulator, the same.  Torment and 
manipulation rob self-determination, and both the thief who stole it and the 
person deprived of it are the less fully human for the loss.  When the 
tormentor or manipulator next comes to court bearing his shameful gain, the 
judge becomes a fence: a receiver of stolen self-determination, who then 
peddles the hot goods to jurors, if they are buying.  As an institution, the court 
itself loses integrity and with that, dignity. 
If there is more to criminal justice than truth-seeking alone, then to 
avoid defeat of the additional goals of dignity and integrity, we have to reject 
even the accurate confession if involuntarily obtained.59  Truth-seeking can 
co-exist with voluntariness, and can even retain primacy as an end, but the 
additional ends of dignity and integrity—if they are to survive with truth-
seeking—require that we seek truth only by means other than involuntary 
confessions. 
 
but observing that “these exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly 
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth”); Elkins 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (defending the exclusionary rule and noting “the 
imperative of judicial integrity”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“The 
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they 
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of 
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of 
the land;” referring to Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights); see also Stone v. Powell, 482 U.S. 
465, 488 (1976); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64–65 (1954) (both acknowledging 
the instrumental goals of the exclusionary rule, but weighing those against truth-seeking). 
 58 To the truth-seeker, a perceived asymmetry in outcomes emerges unavoidably. 
Asymmetry in outcomes appears only from the perspective of the exclusive truth-seeker. For 
her, single-minded in her goal, now some accurate confessions will come into evidence (the 
voluntary ones) and some will not (the involuntary ones). For her, voluntariness is only a 
means to the end of accurate fact-finding, so she sees an asymmetry in outcomes. Whether it 
is an acceptable asymmetry on pragmatic grounds will depend on how commonly inaccurate 
she believes involuntary confessions are, if at all.  As to the importance of judicial integrity, 
see, e.g., Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222. 
 59 The justice system posits other values, too, like efficiency and cost-effectiveness. I do 
not intend to diminish these, but also do not rank them as values of first order, like truth-
seeking, human and institutional integrity, and human and institutional dignity. Because 
efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and other ends are secondary or lower objectives—to my mind, 
at least—I leave them out. As secondary goals, they would not change my views on pursuing 
primary goals. 
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In fact, American courts admit that truth-seeking is not the exclusive 
goal of criminal justice, even if it remains paramount.60  Integrity and dignity 
also matter, both of individual people and of the larger institutions in which 
they operate.  Because integrity, human dignity, and truth-seeking all are 
systemic goals of first order,61 both accurate and inaccurate yet voluntary 
statements should be admitted at trial (compliance with other ends or goals 
here assumed).  But involuntary statements should be excluded, whether 
accurate or inaccurate. 
III 
Again, the unreliable—inaccurate and outright false—confessions of 
Stephen Boorn, Louise Butler, and Dogskin Johnson all came before the 
United States Supreme Court barred coerced statements to the police from 
state criminal trials.62  Since 1892, in Counselman v. Hitchcock, the Supreme 
Court had barred from federal court all statements compelled by law, 
acknowledging the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.63  But that 
rule touched neither state trials nor statements uncompelled by law directly.  
It was another 44 years before the Supreme Court first ruled that statements 
coerced by law officers were inadmissible in state courts under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, in Brown v. Mississippi.64 
Counselman and Brown addressed different problems.  The first 
prohibited compulsion by law directly;65 the second prohibited compulsion 
not by law directly (that is, not by statute or rule), but by law officers.66  In 
 
 60 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 61 In addition to Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. at 285–86, see, e.g., Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–21 (1997) (listing specific fundamental freedoms that are 
essential to ordered liberty, and that substantive due process doctrine protects; among these 
are “bodily integrity” and other interests going to human dignity, like marriage, procreation, 
and marital privacy); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926) (state action “shall be 
consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all of 
our civil and political institutions”); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 
(1937) (noting of such interests “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” that “neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed”), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
 62 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) was the first. 
 63 142 U.S. 547 (1892). As Counselman itself acknowledged, an earlier case, Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), had considered both the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination clause and the Fourth Amendment in striking down a tax statute that compelled 
production of incriminating private papers. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 580–82 (discussing 
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631, 633). 
 64 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 65 Counselman, 142 U.S. at 547. 
 66 Brown, 297 U.S. at 278. 
78 STRANG [Vol. 110 
federal proceedings, the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause 
forbade direct compulsion by law, either through statute or through judicial 
instrument, like a subpoena.67  The Counselman principle was plain in the 
Fifth Amendment’s text: the only tough interpretive question was how long 
before trial something became a “criminal case” under that amendment’s 
express terms.68 
By contrast, Brown and the cases that followed did not address statutory 
requirements that abused the constitutional privilege of silence.  Rather, they 
addressed unacceptable police conduct that abused the human body and will.  
The cases featured brutal third-degree tactics: repeatedly hoisting a suspect 
aloft by a rope around his neck;69 beatings with a leather belt and heavy 
buckle across bare backs and buttocks;70 other forms of physical abuse;71 and 
threats to abandon suspects to the deadly violence of gathered mobs, real or 
imaginary,72 just as Wisconsin officers threatened Dogskin Johnson.73 
 
 67 Counselman, 142 U.S. at 547. 
 68 The answer was that the privilege against self-incrimination extended at least back to a 
grand jury appearance under subpoena. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562 (“It is impossible that 
the meaning of the constitutional provision can only be, that a person shall not be compelled 
to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It would doubtless 
cover such cases; but it is not limited to them. The object was to insure that a person should 
not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might 
tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal 
matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.”). 
 69 See Brown, 297 U.S. at 281. 
 70 See id. at 282. 
 71 See id. at 281–82. 
 72 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564–67 (1958).  For a collection of state cases 
discussing fear of mob violence or threats to leave the accused to a mob, see, e.g., State v. 
Hamilton, 337 Mo. 460, 465–66, 85 S.W.2d 35, 37–38 (1935). 
 73 See BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 115–16. In addition to Brown, early cases included: 
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (threats to mother of loss of child custody); Gallegos 
v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (also a juvenile case); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 
(1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (eight or nine hours of sustained 
interrogation in small room rendered confession “most probably” involuntary where accused 
was mentally ill); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne, 356 U.S. at 564–67; Leyra 
v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (state psychiatrist obtained confession by ruse after sustained 
police questioning); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) 
(the Court’s first consideration of a coerced confession from a juvenile); Malinski v. New 
York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149–54 (1944) (declining 
to resolve disputed details of the “secret inquisitorial practices” or even whether the accused 
actually confessed, but holding that 36 hours of incommunicado interrogation without sleep 
made the confession involuntary if there was one); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) 
(threats of mob violence). These are the principal Supreme Court cases of the 30-year era 
between Brown and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Court held a 
confession involuntary. I do not list cases, like Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), 
and Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), in which the Court rejected an involuntariness 
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Here a complication emerges.  Before the age of the incorporation 
doctrine, when the Supreme Court began to consider explicitly which 
guaranties in the Bill of Rights the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause was meant to include, the Court had applied the Fifth Amendment’s 
self-incrimination clause—not its due process clause—to police conduct in 
federal proceedings.74  Prior to the twentieth century, federal courts held that 
any inducement might render a confession involuntary and thus compelled.  
The Court explained that rule most famously in Bram v. United States.75 
Bram considered a triple murder on the high seas, with the chief mate 
later indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death in Boston federal court.76  At 
trial, the government had introduced Bram’s non-denial into evidence—his 
quibble with whether his accuser could have seen him commit one of the 
murders from the accuser’s vantage point—and then his terse general 
denial.77  Bram had made those statements after the officer questioning him 
had asserted a firm belief in Bram’s guilt, and then added, “But . . . some of 
us here think you could not have done all that crime alone.  If you had an 
accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible crime 
on your own shoulders.”78  Bram was in custody at the time and had been 
forced to disrobe partially so that his clothes could be searched, but the case 
offered no other suggestions of coercion.79 
The Bram court discussed at length both English and American state 
precedents, laying out the exact coaxing words that courts in both countries 
 
claim. Since Miranda, that prophylactic rule has gotten more attention from the Court than 
voluntariness itself. 
 For an expanded discussion of the problem generally, as courts and others perceived it at 
the time of Brown and later, see the so-called Wickersham Commission’s report on police 
brutality and illegality. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1931) (describing police 
abuses and misbehavior during prohibition era). 
 74 Placing the start of the era when the Supreme Court repeatedly has considered 
incorporating specific aspects of the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process guaranty is dicey. Depending on what clarity of signal one seeks, Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and Chi., Burlington 
& Quincy R.R v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), all are plausible points of origin of 
incorporation doctrine. In any event, the incorporation debate seems roughly a twentieth 
century process—although it has extended at least through McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause). 
 75 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
 76 Id. at 537. 
 77 Id. at 538–40. 
 78 Id. at 539. 
 79 Id. at 538–39, 564. 
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had found vitiated the voluntariness of a confession.80  Then it concluded that 
Bram’s statements “must necessarily have been the result of either hope or 
fear, or both, operating on the mind” of the prisoner.81  The statement was 
involuntary; it was not made “without compulsion or inducement of any 
sort.”82  It was inadmissible, a violation of the principle of nemo tenetur 
seipsum accusare that the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause 
enshrined.83  In federal courts of the late nineteenth century, then, the self-
incrimination clause barred statements gained by the compulsion of either 
the law itself or law officers. 
But federal prosecutions were rarer than today, so those federal courts 
had comparatively few criminal cases and still fewer appeals dealing with 
involuntary statements in the aftermath of Bram.  Because Bram came long 
before the Supreme Court applied the privilege against self-incrimination to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, the 
prohibition of involuntary confessions in state prosecutions never took root 
in the self-incrimination clause.  Not until 1964 did the Supreme Court hold 
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fifth Amendment’s self-
incrimination clause.84  By then, Brown, not Bram, was the rule. 
Brown set much less rigorous guidelines for state police officers and 
state cases than Bram had set for the rare federal prosecution.  Brown and 
cases following it ignored Bram’s mark of involuntariness as a promise or 
inducement ever so slight.  Instead, these courts asked whether a beating or 
coercion was so severe that it marked an involuntary confession.85  From the 
standpoint of assuring that trials remain untainted by confessions that are 
unreliable because rooted in fear, pain, exhaustion, trickery, or induced hope 
of gain,86 the doctrinal shift between Bram and Brown—with their different 
constitutional loci—stands as one of the tragic missed opportunities of 
 
 80 Id. at 543–61. 
 81 Id. at 562. The discussion of prior English and American cases runs from pages 540–
61. 
 82 Id. at 548 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896)). The most 
common encapsulation of Bram’s holding comes from its quotation of an English treatise near 
the beginning of the long discussion of earlier cases. “But a confession, in order to be 
admissible, must be free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or 
violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight . . . .” Id. at 542–43 
(quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS 478 (6th 
ed. 1896) (emphasis omitted)). 
 83 Id. at 544–45. 
 84 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4–11 (1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 
78 (1908), which explicitly had refused to apply the self-incrimination clause to the states. 
 85 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936). 
 86 See Bram, 168 U.S. at 542–43, 548. 
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American jurisprudence.  Arguably, too, the descent of Bram before the slow 
ascent of Brown also created the vacuum in which “third-degree” tactics—
harsh, physically abusive or grueling forms of interrogation—and 
incommunicado custody flourished in the first third of the twentieth 
century.87 
Still, the core principle that Brown and its progeny developed was 
dignity, with two facets.  First, the dignity of the court itself was sullied if it 
admitted products of brutality into evidence.  Second, the dignity of the 
human being was tarnished when courts allowed state actors to overcome the 
free will of suspects in eliciting coerced statements.  For both reasons, states 
could not use statements that beatings, threats, or other coercion had 
produced.  An involuntary statement offended both the dignity of the court, 
if the police deployed it in judicial proceedings, and the dignity of the human 
being who gave it only unwillingly.88  Due process would not tolerate either.  
Instead, due process only tolerates confessions that are acts of free will.  As 
the Supreme Court put it later, “a complex of values underlies the stricture 
against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient 
shorthand, this Court terms involuntary.”89  Later still, the Court described 
the fundamental due process objection even more summarily.  Coerced 
confessions are “offensive to a civilized system of justice.”90 
 
 87 See generally DEAN A. STRANG, WORSE THAN THE DEVIL: ANARCHISTS, CLARENCE 
DARROW, AND JUSTICE IN A TIME OF TERROR 199–205 (rev. ed. 2016) (discussing third-degree 
interrogation tactics in appendix). 
 88 Again, a coerced statement also degrades the dignity of the coercive police officer, but 
the Court has left that largely unstated. 
 89 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); see also Brown, 297 U.S. at 285–86. 
The Court did not articulate the twin dignity concerns explicitly in Brown, or the free-will 
standard. It spoke more broadly of extorting confessions by torture, trial by ordeal, and 
confessions that make the “whole [trial] proceeding” “but a mask.” Id. at 286. References to 
free will being overborne and to judicial dignity did not appear explicitly until Watts v. 
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (confessions must be “the expression of free choice” and 
suspect must not be “overborne”), and more clearly until ten years later in Spano v. New York, 
360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (accused’s “will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and 
sympathy falsely aroused”). As to institutional integrity or dignity concerns, see also id. at 
320–21 (“The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone 
on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police 
must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much 
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the 
actual criminals themselves.”). 
 I use dignity when I refer to the individual human being’s interest, but sometimes use 
integrity when I refer to institutional interests as I think it captures the idea better. 
 90 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985). 
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Today, the federal rule holds that involuntariness always requires some 
official coercion or overreaching:91 a person’s own intrinsic inability, by 
reason of mental illness or other weakness, to make a true volitional choice 
to speak never is enough to make his statement legally “involuntary.”92  For 
example, a command hallucination, heard only by the delusional person, does 
not render his subsequent statement legally involuntary.93  Instead, a police 
officer, or on rare occasion some other state actor, must do something 
affirmative to exploit the person’s vulnerability.94 
The usual formulation of voluntariness that Brown spawned is that an 
accused’s statements, to be usable in court, must be “the product of a rational 
intellect and a free will,” or words to that effect.95  Equivalently, the 
accused’s statements are unusable if his “will was overborne.”96  There is no 
actual test, though: trial courts should consider the “totality” of 
circumstances in deciding the question of free will before admitting a 
confession.97  At best, that is a method or an orientation, not a test, and at 
worst it may be no more than an exhortation.  By whatever measure, the 
question of voluntariness is not for the jury alone; rather, the trial court must 
determine voluntariness before the state offers a confession.98 
Mechanically, the prosecution bears the burden of proving 
voluntariness.99  In federal court, the standard of persuasion is a 
preponderance; states may require more from the prosecution, but not less.100  
 
 91 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 92 Id. at 164, 165–66. 
 93 Id. at 162, 167. 
 94 Id. at 167. For one example of the atypical involuntariness case in which the state actor 
was not formally a law enforcement officer, see United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. 
Wis. 1994), aff’d, 63 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 517 U.S. 1231 (1996), 
aff’d after remand, 115 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1997) (social worker in county mental hospital, 
acting in part to aid law enforcement, elicited involuntary confessions from a patient in her 
care). 
 95 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 
293, 307 (1963); Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 208. The words vary, but the standard is always to 
this effect. 
 96 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 307 (quoting Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961)); see also 
Watts, 338 U.S. at 53. 
 97 Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1968) (quoting Clewis v. Texas, 386 
U.S. 707, 708 (1967)); see also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957). 
 98 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391–96 (1964). 
 99 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). 
 100 Id. at 482–89. Many states set the burden there, too, although some require more of the 
prosecution—as Lego invited them to do. Id. at 489; see also Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About 
Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 601, 642 n.228 (2006) (providing a non-exhaustive list of state rules). 
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An involuntary confession may not be used at all in court: not in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief, not for impeachment, not in rebuttal.101  A 
mistakenly admitted involuntary confession once was, but no longer is, 
reason for automatic reversal.  Now, a conviction can stand if the prosecution 
proves the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.102 
The jury cannot screen a confession for voluntariness in the first 
instance—again, that is a judge’s job before the state offers the confession.  
But the defense can insist that the jury determine the reliability of that 
confession in the end.103 
This is where the law of involuntary confessions stands today, then.  
Normative alternatives and a missed opportunity aside, the question is due 
process generally, not the privilege against self-incrimination specifically.104  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has jettisoned Bram.  As even the more moderate 
plurality conceded in Arizona v. Fulminante, the Bram rule that a confession 
may not be obtained by promises or inducements, however slight, by 1991 
did “not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a 
confession.”105  A pretrial hearing on admissibility will decide voluntariness, 
with the prosecution carrying a burden of at least a preponderance of the 
 
 101 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–08 (1985); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 
459 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 402 (1978); cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 
714 (1975) (otherwise trustworthy statement taken in violation of Miranda may be used for 
impeachment, although not in the prosecution’s case-in-chief). 
 102 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–12 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., announcing the 
holding on this point) (applying Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error 
doctrine to involuntary confessions for first time). 
 103 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). 
 104 Some academic writers gamely have suggested reconsidering the normative 
framework and have proposed new regimens for considering voluntariness under the self-
incrimination clause, the due process clause, or both. For a sampling, see Mark A. Godsey, 
Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying 
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (2005); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, 
Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979); Lawrence Herman, The 
Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and 
the Involuntary Confession Rule, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking 
Self-Incrimination, Voluntariness, and Coercion, Through a Perspective of Jewish Law and 
Legal Theory, 12 J. L. SOC’Y 72 (2010); Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: 
Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2015) (noting the deontological 
strand of voluntariness doctrine (odious police practices) and the consequentialist strand 
(concern over false confessions) and arguing that they should be disentangled and separated 
into different tests). In the courts so far, no takers. 
 105 499 U.S. at 285. 
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evidence.  If the judge decides that the balance tips toward voluntariness, the 
jury may hear an otherwise admissible confession.106 
In making that determination, the totality-of-the-circumstances rhetoric 
amply cloaks a wide range of intellectual dishonesty by trial and appellate 
judges.  They regularly wave through custodial confessions when police 
officers have lied to suspects about facts and evidence, fed facts, bullied, 
cajoled, promised leniency, and otherwise manipulated or intimidated 
suspects.   They do so even when the suspects were young, inexperienced, 
obviously mentally ill, clearly unintelligent or cognitively disabled, drunk, 
high, exhausted or sleep-deprived, or some combination of these qualities.107 
IV 
With all that the totality-of-the-circumstances phrase allows, and by its 
terms it proposes to allow everything, there is one striking exception: courts 
may not consider the accuracy or truthfulness of a confession in deciding its 
voluntariness.  That bar rests on one Supreme Court decision now nearly six 
decades old, Rogers v. Richmond.108  The prohibition is right, both as a matter 
of fidelity to Rogers and of logic: accuracy of a confession’s details does not 
bear logically on its voluntariness or, therefore, on its admissibility.  But is 
the inverse—that inaccuracy of a confession’s details does bear on 
voluntariness—also foreclosed by Rogers and its logic, as most courts have 
assumed or ruled?109  No. 
A 
One evening in November 1953, Dorothy Kennedy was working alone 
in the liquor store that she and her husband owned in West Haven, 
 
 106 By “otherwise admissible,” I mean simply that involuntariness is not the only possible 
reason for excluding a confession. There may be a Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
issue, or a Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), issue in a joint trial, or some other 
possible reason for keeping a confession from a jury. 
 107 Marcus, supra note 100 (discussing a review of every reported state and federal 
voluntary confession appellate decision between 1985–2005 and documenting all of these 
common factors). For one more recent graphic example, consider the videotaped excerpts of 
Brendan Dassey’s confession that Making A Murderer offered. As the full videotape confirms, 
Dassey was a mentally limited 16-year old. After haltingly adopting or conceding details often 
supplied by police interviewers and admitting, in that fashion, his direct involvement in the 
rape and murder of a young woman, Dassey asked if he could return to school because he had 
a project due in sixth period. Making A Murderer, supra note 1. 
 108 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
 109 See infra note 140. 
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Connecticut.110  At about 7:30 p.m., someone came in, robbed the cash 
register of $60, and killed Dorothy with a gun.111 
More than six weeks later, in early January 1954, New Haven police 
sought Harold Rogers in connection with a separate break-in and theft at a 
hotel.112  The police found Rogers sitting in his car with a .38 caliber revolver 
and arrested him.113  They learned soon that the gun had been reported stolen 
from Rogers’s nephew the very day that Dorothy Kennedy was murdered.114  
Later ballistics testing matched the gun to the bullets that killed her.115 
Rogers eventually confessed twice to shooting Dorothy Kennedy and 
robbing her store.116  Convicted at trial of first-degree murder, he was 
sentenced to death.117  On appeal, he argued principally that his confessions 
were involuntary and should have been excluded.118  He claimed that jailers 
had refused to allow his lawyer into the jail and that a police officer had 
pretended, in his presence, to call other officers with directions that they 
bring his wife to police headquarters and take their foster children into 
detention.119  Only under this duress had he confessed, he said.120  Then, he 
reasoned, his later confession to the coroner was but a product of the first.121 
The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors rejected his arguments and 
agreed with the trial court that his confessions were voluntary.  “The question 
is whether, under these and other circumstances of the case, that [police] 
conduct induced the defendant to confess falsely that he had committed the 
crime being investigated,” the state supreme court opined.122  Or, restated, 
“the question for the court to decide was whether this conduct induced the 
defendant to make an involuntary and hence untrue statement.”123  No, that 
court answered.124 
 
 110 State v. Rogers, 120 A.2d 409, 411 (Conn. 1956). 
 111 Rogers, 120 A.2d at 411. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 410. 
 118 Id. at 412. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. (citations omitted). 
 124 Id. 
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After a complicated post-conviction history, Rogers eventually got to 
the United States Supreme Court on federal habeas review.125  The basic issue 
there, again, was the voluntariness of his confessions.  A factual dispute on 
exactly what the police had said to Rogers during the course of interrogation, 
and when or if he had requested a lawyer, presented a messy case.126 
The Supreme Court decided that it did not have to sift through the 
factual mess, though.  Both the Connecticut trial court and state supreme 
court had applied the wrong standard for deciding the voluntariness of a 
confession.127  They repeatedly had considered whether the police tactics 
might have produced false confessions, not whether those tactics produced 
involuntary ones: 
To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascertained 
extent, found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding 
confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on this consideration. Indeed, in 
many of the cases in which the command of the Due Process Clause has compelled 
us to reverse state convictions involving the use of confessions obtained by 
impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the 
truth of what the defendant had confessed.128 
The state courts had decided admissibility of the confessions “by 
reference to a legal standard which took into account the circumstance of 
probable truth or falsity.”129  That was an impermissible standard under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.130  Rogers was entitled to have the state courts 
consider anew whether he confessed voluntarily, under the proper 
standard.131 
On remand, the state apparently offered Rogers a reduced charge of 
second-degree murder and a life sentence.132  He reportedly took the deal.133 
 
 125 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 537–40 (1961). 
 126 Id. at 535–37. 
 127 Id. at 540. 
 128 Id. at 541. 
 129 Id. at 543. Note that “truth or falsity” is a formulaic phrase, in the academic sense; 
what linguists once called automatic speech or embolalia. In other words, it is a stock 
expression, used often and uncritically, that has signification as a whole, independent of its 
strict lexical or grammatical meaning and construction, and not processed word-for-word by 
those competent in a given language. 
 130 Id. at 543–44. 
 131 Id. at 543–44, 548–49. 
 132 Wilfred J. Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases 
Reversed by U.S. Supreme Court and Some Current Problems, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 202, 
209 n.33 (1962). 
 133 Id. 
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Although the Rogers court made one reference to the impropriety of 
taking “into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity,”134 the 
decision rested on the fact that the Connecticut courts had asked whether 
anything the police or coroner did called into real question the accuracy of 
the confessions.135  The state court decisions reflected an implicit assumption 
that Rogers had confessed truthfully and accurately.  Given the facts that 
Rogers had his nephew’s gun at the time of his arrest, that the nephew had 
reported the gun stolen before the liquor store robbery and murder, and that 
ballistics testing linked the fatal bullets to the gun in Rogers’s possession,136 
the assumption that Rogers in fact was the murderer had support.  Both state 
courts below clearly believed him guilty in fact, and the United States 
Supreme Court nowhere disputed that belief; his guilt and the truthfulness 
and accuracy of his confessions simply were beside the point.  Even ignoring 
Rogers’s later guilty plea to a reduced charge, the case for his guilt was 
strong.  A judicial focus on the accuracy—not the possible inaccuracy—of 
his confessions was unsurprising. 
B 
Rogers v. Richmond stands as solid support for the proposition that 
courts must not consider accuracy or probable accuracy of a confession as 
any proof of its voluntariness.  The confession may be perfectly truthful and 
accurate.  But if it was involuntary, its truth and accuracy will not save its 
admission—and indeed, accuracy does not matter to the due process 
question. 
In the main, though, for almost six decades state and lower federal 
courts have read Rogers casually and more broadly.  They often have 
assumed, uncritically, that just as accuracy has no role in deciding 
voluntariness, so too inaccuracy or untruthfulness of a confession must have 
no role in deciding its involuntariness.137  Truth does not bear on 
voluntariness, yes; but courts have seized on and quoted the passing reference 
to “truth or falsity” in Rogers.138  So implicitly, maybe falsity would not bear 
on involuntariness, either.  Courts have assumed that the Rogers proposition 
bars the inverse of the proposition.  On occasion, but less commonly, they 
 
 134 Rogers, 365 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added). 
 135 State v. Rogers, 120 A.2d 409, 413 (Conn. 1956); see also Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540–
43. 
 136 State v. Rogers, 120 A.2d at 411. 
 137 See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 138 365 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added). 
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have gone further and expressly held that the inverse is foreclosed, rejecting 
claims that confessions were both untrue and involuntary.139 
The vast majority of courts fall into the first group of casual or 
deliberately broad readers.  Just a few examples will suffice here, but the 
assiduous or skeptical can find many more than the ten I choose for a round 
number.140 
At least one other court seemed not to understand Rogers v. Richmond 
at all, although this is rare. Thirty years after that case, the Virginia 
intermediate appellate court still seemed to equate involuntariness with 
unreliability.141 
 
 139 See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 140 The reported appellate decisions run into the dozens, at least, and probably the 
hundreds. A sampling of these includes: Moorer v. South Carolina, 368 F.2d 458, 462 (4th 
Cir. 1966) (inculpatory statement never actually admitted, but the fact that defendant had said 
something to the police that the state wished to offer was presented to the jury, and defendant 
had no chance to have the jury consider voluntariness (this trial occurred before Jackson v. 
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)); Hutcherson v. United States, 351 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(several references to ignoring “truth or falsity” in deciding voluntariness); United States v. 
Pumpkin Seed, No. CR 17-50017-JLV, 2018 WL 6567258, slip op. at *3-4 (D.S.D. December 
13, 2018) (defendant in first percentile of full-scale IQ challenged voluntariness of confession 
and called psychiatrist on his susceptibility to giving false confession; court discounts that 
evidence on grounds that, “Whether he subsequently gave a false confession is a separate jury 
question” from whether the statement was voluntary, and then quoting “truth or falsity” 
formula); State v. Sheppard, 987 S.W.2d 677, 679–80 (Ark. 1999) (defendant disputed 
truthfulness of his confession, which a police investigator had written and he had signed; trial 
court excluded it as “not the statement of the defendant at all” and “inherently 
nontrustworthy;” reversed on state’s interlocutory appeal on express grounds that the trial 
judge should not have considered the untrustworthiness of the statement; one reference to truth 
or falsity); In re Schlette, 42 Cal. Rptr. 708, 712–14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (defense argued 
at trial that confession was false; court of appeals decides voluntariness “without regard to the 
confession’s truth or falsity”); State v. Staples, 399 A.2d 1269, 1272, 1273 (Conn. 1978) (two 
references to ignoring “truth or falsity”); one reference to deciding voluntariness without 
regard for truth or falsity on remand); People v. Weger, 185 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. 1962) (several 
references to ignoring “truth or falsity” in deciding voluntariness); Mulligan v. State, 308 A.2d 
418, 424–25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (defendant claimed involuntariness and falsity of 
confession; court makes two references to deciding voluntariness without regard to truth or 
falsity); State v. Hayes, 424 N.W.2d 624, 625–26 (Neb. 1988) (defendant, a high school 
dropout with below average reading and writing skills, claimed confession involuntary and 
testified at trial to a different version of fact; on appeal, voluntariness affirmed with reference 
to voluntariness not resting upon “probable truth or falsity”); Davis v. State, 499 S.W.2d 303, 
304–05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (defendant seems to have denied truth of his confession at 
trial and claimed it coerced; two references to deciding voluntariness without regard to truth 
or falsity). 
 141 Neustadter v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 391, 397 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). Implicitly, 
the court suggested more than once that only an unreliable confession could be involuntary. 
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Finally, once in a while, a court approaches indirectly and timidly the 
possibility that Rogers v. Richmond may not foreclose asking how a false 
confession bears on involuntariness, although it does foreclose asking how 
accuracy bears on voluntariness.142  Even that tiptoe approach to a basic 
question—Rogers clearly makes accuracy of a confession irrelevant to 
voluntariness, but is its inverse foreclosed?  In other words, is inaccuracy of 
a confession relevant to voluntariness?—has been very rare. 
V 
Nothing in Rogers v. Richmond’s factual background, in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion itself, or in the Connecticut high court’s opinion below, gives 
any real warrant—let alone a mandate—for reading the case as holding that 
the inverse proposition must be foreclosed, even if true.  Rogers forecloses 
reliance on accuracy as any proof of voluntariness.  Considered without the 
clutter of casual or unthinking readings, Rogers does not foreclose reliance 
on inaccuracies as some proof of involuntariness.143 
Again, Harold Rogers probably was guilty, at least on the facts that the 
Connecticut high court and the United States Supreme Court recited.144  The 
point, then, was that accuracy and truthfulness of that man’s admissions had 
no place in deciding whether he spoke voluntarily.  But suppose another 
Rogers arrived in the Supreme Court with real questions about his innocence, 
in a case without the significant corroboration that the first Rogers’s case 
 
 142 See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1018 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 
banc). Preston is ambiguous. The body of the opinion predictably recites that “the 
voluntariness inquiry focuses not on the truth or falsity of the confession, but on the coercive 
nature of the interrogation—again, taking into account the particular circumstances of the 
suspect.” But the related lengthy footnote then does observe that, “Although probable truth 
does not demonstrate that a confession was voluntary, we note that there is abundant research 
that the intellectually disabled ‘are more likely to confess falsely for a variety of reasons.’” Id. 
at 1018 n.13 (citation omitted). It goes on to assert that, “Recognizing the heightened 
likelihood of false confessions by intellectually disabled suspects does not contravene Rogers’ 
directive that truth or falsity is not part of the voluntariness inquiry.” Id. Rather, “our 
observation regarding false confessions by the intellectually disabled . . . informs the 
importance of carefully taking into account the intellectual disability of the suspect—not the 
truth or falsity of the confession—as part of the totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness 
inquiry.” Id. So, while even Preston in the end rejects direct consideration of falsity as a 
possible marker of legal involuntariness, it at least evinces an awareness of a factual 
connection and looks for a way indirectly to include falsity in the inquiry. 
 143 I refer only to Rogers v. Richmond on this point. But Jackson v. Denno also says, “It 
is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his 
conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for 
the truth or falsity of the confession.” 378 U.S. at 376 (1964). Jackson cites only Rogers there 
and adds nothing to Rogers on that point. 
 144 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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apparently had.  Suppose this second Rogers could claim plausibly not just 
that he confessed involuntarily but that he confessed falsely.  The Supreme 
Court’s 1961 decision simply does not necessarily foreclose the possibility 
that factual inaccuracies in this next man’s confessions properly might have 
helped to demonstrate their involuntariness. 
American courts have read Rogers both carelessly and wrongly to bar 
inaccuracies from the assessment of voluntariness, just as the case bars 
accuracy.145  The conditional proposition of Rogers, rightly read, is that if 
details of a confession are accurate, then that is irrelevant to voluntariness.  
The conditional proposition is true.  As a matter of logic and experience, 
though, its inverse also may be true: if details of a confession are inaccurate, 
then that is not irrelevant to voluntariness.  A case that stands clearly for the 
conditional proposition does not necessarily stand against its inverse.  
Rightly understood, the case allows the inverse, if true, just as the conditional 
proposition itself logically allows the inverse.146 
And the inverse is true.  A prisoner who gives accurate details to his 
interrogators can be a guilty/coerced speaker, a guilty/uncoerced speaker, or 
an innocent/coerced speaker to whom the interrogators supplied details.147  If 
coercion and involuntariness are unacceptable because dignity and integrity 
are ends, as every case over the quarter century between Brown and Rogers 
asserted, then accuracy simply is irrelevant.  Accuracy in detail is incapable 
of helping to discriminate among those three possible explanations—
incapable of divining whether those ends of dignity and integrity were 
satisfied or not.  Courts must look instead to the means of obtaining the 
confession, not retrospectively to its accuracy. 
By contrast, inaccuracy of a confession may be, and often is, probative 
of involuntariness.  Unlike accuracy, inaccuracy may itself help 
retrospectively to determine the means by which police elicited the 
confession or understand their effects.  The inaccuracies are probative of the 
involuntariness question, but not necessarily dispositive of it. 
This distinction is important.  A voluntary speaker who wishes to 
confess may give inaccurate details because intoxication or mental illness 
 
 145 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 146 As a matter of the philosophy and mathematics of logic, the truth of a conditional 
proposition allows the truth of its inverse, too. If P → Q is true, ~P → ~Q also may be true. 
See, e.g., KARL J. SMITH, THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICS 89–95 (13th ed. 2016). 
 147 Or, in theory, an innocent/uncoerced speaker who either is mentally ill or is taking a 
fall for someone, and in either case luckily guessed just right at factual details. The innocent 
who seeks to inculpate himself freely and who guesses correctly at details of a crime he did 
not commit will be more of a theoretical possibility than real-life presence in police precinct 
houses, though. 
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eroded her memory or she seeks to reduce her responsibility.  But it also is 
true that the involuntary speaker who seeks just to stop the interrogation may 
offer inaccurate details.  This might be either because she is innocent and 
does not know what happened or because she is guilty but assesses which 
responses will satisfy the interrogators and end the questioning most quickly.  
In all events, inaccuracies at very least are relevant to involuntariness.  The 
judge has only to sift the types of inaccuracies in light of all other known 
circumstances—was the prisoner in fact drunk or deluded at the time of the 
crime; did the prisoner exaggerate or understate her culpability?—to assign 
proper weight to inaccuracies in the voluntariness query. 
And because lack of memory, false partial evasion of responsibility, or 
both, are common factors in explaining inaccuracies, again those 
inaccuracies may not establish involuntariness by themselves.  But they are 
probative. 
In an evidentiary process that exalts the totality of circumstances, a case 
that serves one conditional proposition—if details are accurate, then that is 
irrelevant to voluntariness—never should have been read to ban its inverse 
conditional proposition.  For both the proposition and its inverse may be true.  
Indeed, the inverse of Rogers v. Richmond is true: if details are inaccurate, 
then that is not irrelevant to voluntariness.  The inaccuracies help a court to 
get closer to the truth not of a crime, but of the question whether the 
supplementary ends of dignity and integrity were honored.  Since Rogers, 
courts never should have read the case to foreclose its inverse proposition.  
Logic and experience support both the Rogers proposition and its inverse. 
VI 
A 
Again, before Brown, as a matter of federal law, when Stephen Boorn, 
Louise Butler, and Dogskin Johnson stood trial involuntariness did not make 
their confessions inadmissible in state courts; state law alone determined that.  
Given the slim record of those cases that we have now, the exact challenges 
to Boorn’s written confession and to one of Butler’s oral statements are 
unclear.  It seems certain that Johnson, who pled guilty the same day, did not 
challenge the voluntariness of his confession. 
All three of these people were convicted, though, in part on the basis of 
false confessions.  Boorn was sentenced to hang;148 Butler and Johnson, to 
 
 148 BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 18. 
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life in prison.149  They all escaped their fates only by luck, and for Johnson, 
luck waited ten years.150 
For our purposes, all of those confessions carried obvious indications of 
possible falsity even before two “murdered” people turned up healthy and, in 
Dogskin Johnson’s case, before the truth of a little girl’s death emerged a 
decade later.  Each case also had features, teased from the dry summaries that 
Professor Borchard provided, that might have sharpened an involuntariness 
inquiry.  Those features included relevant inaccuracies in all three cases. 
Boorn was an outcast, a social misfit, who was interrogated repeatedly 
over months by authorities.151  His eventual confession did not match the 
admissions that his brother claimed Stephen had made.152  Beyond that, 
Boorn’s police confession lay greater claim to his own criminal responsibility 
than even his brother attributed to him.153  The brother had implicated both 
Stephen and himself, but Boorn implicated only himself in his statement to 
the police.154  Finally, the third “confession” that the state of Vermont offered 
at trial was his brother’s supposed statement to a jailhouse informer, who got 
a benefit of early freedom in exchange for his testimony against Boorn.155  
Overarching all of these three supposed confessions was one truth: no 
physical evidence or disinterested witness corroborated any version of a 
murder. 
Butler was a black woman, apparently impoverished, in rural Alabama 
during the Jim Crow era.156  She supposedly confessed to a male sheriff, 
surely white, and it seems she and the sheriff were the only two witnesses to 
the circumstances of her confession.157  In questioning Butler, the sheriff 
(who later would describe Butler as “ignorant,” according to Borchard) had 
the benefit of a lurid version of a murder that a deputy obtained earlier from 
her young niece and daughter.158  Butler eventually took credit for a gruesome 
murder, loosely similar in details to the versions that the girls gave and the 
sheriff could have supplied.159  That murder unavoidably would have left 
blood and gore after its ax attack and dismemberment.  But blood and gore 
 
 149 Id. at 43, 115. 
 150 Id. at 116. 
 151 Id. at 15. 
 152 Id. at 17, 18–19. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 18. 
 156 Id. at 40. 
 157 Id. at 42. 
 158 Id. at 40–42, 45. 
 159 Id. at 42. 
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were utterly absent from the scene, for all Borchard’s account shows (and 
recall again, the murdered girl later turned up unhurt).  For that matter, the 
state found no body that supposedly had been pitched into the river in a sack.   
The absence of a body perhaps river currents could explain, but the absence 
of any physical evidence at the supposed murder scene was not easily 
dismissed and nowhere explained.160 
By inference, Dogskin Johnson perhaps was, in today’s parlance, 
cognitively impaired.  He also abused alcohol and was an object of wide 
public derision; again, a social outcast.161  His confession came after hours 
of interrogation that even the buttoned-down Borchard depicted as harsh and 
a police trick that exploited deliberately this man’s deep terror of mob 
violence, from watching a lynching sometime earlier.162  The confession 
failed utterly to explain, and could not be reconciled with, known physical 
facts: Johnson could not have entered the house through the tiny broken 
window pane; even the little girl could not have left the house that way; and 
neither the girl’s brothers nor her dog, just feet away in the same room, were 
awakened by a breaking window or intruder anyway.163  Lastly, there was no 
alternate explanation for how Johnson might have entered the family’s 
house.164 
So, what if those three courts could have considered inaccuracy of 
details in these confessions in deciding whether the statements were 
voluntary?  Wild inaccuracies logically might have helped to understand the 
months of intermittent interrogation that led to Boorn’s statement.  They 
reasonably might have shed light on what really passed between the sheriff 
and Louise Butler alone in his office and at the river’s edge.  They might 
have helped meaningfully to reveal why Dogskin Johnson fell apart and 
abandoned his repeated claims of innocence in the jail.  At very least, what 
 
 160 Throughout his book, Borchard treated white as the neutral color or race and mentioned 
ethnicity or race only as to non-whites; for example, he described Louise Butler as a “plump 
light-brown negress” and her paramour as “a lean colored gentleman.” Borchard also quoted 
the sheriff (whose race and color he did not mention) later making a reference to “white-folks” 
in a context that included law enforcement, so almost surely—even apart from historical 
realities in the 1920s deep south—that the officers were white. Id. at 29.  
 161 Id. at 114. 
 162 Id. at 116–17. 
 163 Id. at 116. 
 164 Although Borchard did not describe physical violence by the police or say squarely 
that Johnson was held incommunicado, the terms he did use suggested that the police 
interviews may have employed “third-degree” tactics that were common in the early 1900s 
before Brown. Id. at 116; see also STRANG supra note 87 and accompanying text. Indeed, 
Borchard even described Johnson as “psychologically ‘beaten’ into a confession,” and this is 
one of the few cases in which Borchard criticized police conduct overtly. BORCHARD, supra 
note 2, at 119. 
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if courts today could consider inaccuracies like these in deciding 
voluntariness, when the inevitable successors of Boorn, Butler, and Johnson 
come along again as they frequently do? 
Together, these three old cases display several common vulnerabilities 
that can contribute to false confessions.  Those include social ostracism or 
living on social margins, possible cognitive impairment, disadvantages of 
race and class, lack of sophistication, hope of benefit or leniency, youth 
(especially Butler’s niece and daughter), drug or alcohol dependency, public 
outrage over a crime and pressure on the police to solve it, and the anchoring 
bias effect of a prior record on the police. The three cases also include several 
features of police conduct that can contribute to false confessions: prolonged 
questioning; intermittent questioning over weeks or months (in Boorn); 
multiple questioners; absence of a lawyer during interrogation, almost 
certainly; isolation; official trickery, manipulation, and deceit; sleep 
deprivation; and induced fear (certainly in Johnson).  None of these points of 
vulnerability, none of these police stratagems, were new then; all persist now, 
although some (physical pain, questioning over weeks or months) are less 
common today.165 
A judge considering the confluence of some of these factors rightly 
might view the inaccuracy of details given in those circumstances as bearing 
on voluntariness.  If the voluntariness of the confession is in doubt, might not 
inaccuracies bear logically on that question?  Of course.  And the more so 
where a lack of physical trace evidence is not just surprising, but 
inexplicable.  Or where the inaccuracy seems to overstate the confessing 
prisoner’s culpability, not understate it.  Or where the prisoner’s account is 
hopelessly at odds with objectively verifiable facts. 
 
 165 For risk factors generally in false confessions, see, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 14–44, 145–77 
(2011) (using real vignettes to set in broader context some factors involved in false 
confessions, and why they result in convictions); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The 
Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004); Brandon 
L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1051–19 (2010) 
(focusing primarily on related problem of confession contamination); Saul M. Kassin, False 
Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform, 1 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 
112 (2014); Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 332, 332–43 (2009); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The 
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in 
the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). In offering 
this partial survey, I choose Professors Drizin, Leo, Ofshe, Kassin, and Garrett in part because 
they all have written much more than I cite here on the contributing risks to, and general 
phenomenon of, false confessions. Sometimes, two or three of them have written together or 
with still others. 
2020] INACCURACY AND THE INVOLUNTARY CONFESSION 95 
B 
Nothing in Rogers v. Richmond bars that consideration.  The fact that 
the Court employed once a formulaic phrase—“truth or falsity”166—does not 
foreclose the relevance of inaccuracy to involuntariness.  In its entirety, 
Rogers v. Richmond rested for good reasons on the premise that the 
confession there was truthful.167  Truth was the assumption; falsity was not 
the issue at all.  Rather, the question was whether the police overbore the 
prisoner’s will—and with more lawyerly precision, that was the “question to 
be answered with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact 
spoke the truth.”168 
A quarter century after Brown, the Supreme Court still was struggling 
to impress upon American courts the importance of human and institutional 
dignity and integrity goals, apart from truth-seeking.  Although grants of 
certiorari often are hard to explain confidently, especially at six decades’ 
distance, still try to imagine why the Court otherwise took this case: if not an 
effort to advance goals beyond narrow truth-seeking, then the Supreme 
Court’s work was mere error correction on behalf of a man almost surely 
guilty.  Whatever the reasons for taking the case, though, Rogers v. Richmond 
unmistakably made the point that other goals matter, again.  Ignoring the 
accuracy of a confession in deciding its voluntariness is entirely consistent 
with, indeed perhaps essential to, honoring those dignity and integrity goals. 
But ignoring inaccuracy of a confession as bearing on its possible 
involuntariness is not essential to honoring those distinct goals.  To the 
contrary, because identifying coerced or otherwise involuntary confessions 
is a central goal of these dignity and integrity concerns, anything that bears 
logically on the question of involuntariness should be available to a judge.  
Accuracy of details in a confession does not make it more likely that the 
confession was voluntary, for reasons outlined in Part II and explained in Part 
V.  The guilty speaker can be coerced as readily as the innocent one, and 
either can be supplied facts by the police, through intentional or inadvertent 
contamination of the interview.  But inaccuracy of details, although rarely 
dispositive alone, surely bears logically on possible involuntariness.  Yes, the 
inaccurate speaker may be guilty but understating his culpability strategically 
or just unclear about details because of his mental state at the time.  But he 
also may be giving inaccurate details because he is innocent, does not know 
 
 166 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543 (1961). This stock phrase, an automatic 
expression signaling neutrality, is what the Court repeated in Jackson v. Denno, again only 
once. 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964); see also supra note 129. 
 167 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 168 Rogers, 365 U.S. at 543. 
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the true details, and is trying to please an overbearing interrogator or to end 
a process in which he is an unhappy, involuntary participant.  Whichever of 
these alternatives proves correct or probable, the inaccuracies are relevant; 
they help get logically to the answer. 
For that matter, the types of inaccuracies are sorted easily.  Understating 
or deflecting culpability more likely suggests an act of volition, although not 
surely; but overstating culpability, for obvious reasons, may signal 
involuntariness (if not mental illness or desire to protect a friend or family 
member).  Peripheral inaccuracies that can be squared easily with physical 
evidence or known objective facts bear on involuntariness, although perhaps 
weakly in the absence of police contamination; but inaccuracies that defy 
reality or that are impossibilities (or near impossibilities) given other 
objective evidence again are strong signals of possible involuntariness. 
In all events, acknowledging the probative value of inaccuracies in 
considering involuntariness is consistent with the factual and legal context of 
Rogers v. Richmond.  That acknowledgment also presents no asymmetry in 
the supplemental systemic goals of dignity and integrity—of the individual 
accused, of law enforcement officers, and of courts and other criminal justice 
institutions themselves.  Acknowledging this probative value, and admitting 
inaccuracies into the realm of the “totality,” serves dignity and integrity goals 
with the same logical consistency that continuing to exclude accuracy of 
confessions serves those supplemental systemic goals.  The proposition that 
inaccuracy is relevant to voluntariness is just as true as the proposition that 
accuracy is not relevant to voluntariness.  Both propositions serve essential 
dignity and integrity. 
Not alone for pursuing truth do courts and law enforcement agencies 
exist, after all.  Theoretically or ideally, these human institutions exist and 
work in assemblage to serve justice and liberty; to be a justice system, a name 
they immodestly claim.  They exist to demonstrate to the governed that no 
governmental end is worth every possible means, let alone those means that 
debase the humanity of both the governed and the government itself.  
Precisely because they lay claim to the word justice, these institutions exist 
to advance the paradoxical quest that winds through the whole history of 
humankind: to advance norms of humanity and oust norms of inhumanity.  
Humanity has been, and continues to be, puzzlingly hard for humans. 
In that quest, though, truth is not subordinate; it merely must coexist 
with other humane values also of first order.169  But if cases of inaccurate, 
 
 169 I am aware of nobody who ever has advocated sacrificing truth altogether to dignity 
and integrity. Even before the Supreme Court applied harmless error doctrine to admission of 
involuntary confessions in Arizona v. Fulminante, in the era of automatic reversal, it allowed 
retrial on untainted evidence. And in the first instance, a trial court that rules a confession 
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unreliable, or outright false confessions reveal nothing else, they unmask the 
reality that inaccurate confessions do not advance reliably the search for 
substantive truth.  They are more likely to impede that search, sometimes 
with disastrously mistaken verdicts that convict the innocent. 
Stephen Boorn, Louise Butler, and Dogskin Johnson press this point 
from the grave.  Many more today and still to come depend upon police 
officers, lawyers, and courts to grasp the point.  In the end, a better 
understanding of the rule in Rogers v. Richmond is symmetrical not just with 
supplemental systemic goals, but with truth-seeking itself. 
 
involuntary does not dismiss charges. It only excludes the involuntary confession and, 
occasionally, its fruits. All other untainted evidence remains available for truth-seeking and 
trial. See supra notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text. 
